The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child

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Looking Back—and Forward—at *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*

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The following (quite personal and idiosyncratic) review of *The PSOC*'s first volume, published in 1945, highlights some aspects of then-current psychoanalytic thinking that have passed—or failed—the test of time.

Two abstractions rise from the particulars of the volume's twenty-five chapters. First, those authors who respected the position of the founding editors—that is, that child psycho analysis was both independent from related fields and, at the same time, dependent upon them—tend to have fared better than those who allowed their psychoanalytic theories (and sometimes personal rancor) to cloud their views of the facts on the ground.

Second, many of the contributions in this first volume integrated an intrapsychic perspective with an environmental or social one. This gave the work of these authors a kind of vitality that is lost when psychoanalytic theory is used to promote adaptation and social conformity. Perhaps it is worth recalling Freud's (1900) opening to The Interpretation of Dreams: “Flectere si nequeo Superos, Acheronta movebo” (If I cannot move the heavens, I shall shake the nether regions).

Freud and *The PSOC*'s founding editors knew very well how disturbing psycho analysis could be to the *Superos*, the established order. The revolutionary potential of Freud's analysis of the human condition attracted some remarkable people to the field, most of whom believed that intrapsychic and social changes are intimately related to each other. We would do well to emulate their example; only such an integration will keep psycho analysis alive in the twenty-first century.

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The first volume of *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* (*PSOC*), published in 1945, opened with the following preface by the founding editors—Anna Freud, Heinz Hartmann, and Ernst Kris:

> *The contribution of psycho analysis to the study of the child covers many areas. In therapy the range extends from child analysis to child guidance and group work; in theory, from the basic problems of genetic psychology to those concerned with the interrelation of culture and the upbringing of the child. While many psychiatric techniques and many concepts upon which psychologists and educators rely bear the imprint of psychoanalytic thought, contributions to this Annual center on psychoanalytic hypotheses. It is hoped that from this center contacts with neighboring fields will be established.*
>
> *The Annual is an Anglo-American venture. We hope that in following volumes we may include contributions from other countries. (1945, p. 9)*

This simple, unprepossessing introduction brings to mind Freud's (1927) comment in *The Future of an Illusion* that “The voice of the intellect is a soft one, but it does not rest till it has gained a hearing.” The preface was a kind of “declaration of independence” in that it put psycho analysis at its center, rather than have it serve as a handmaiden to the more-established fields of psychiatry, psychology, and education. At the same time, while psycho analysis was clearly the lodestar in the minds of *The PSOC*'s editors, “contacts with neighboring fields” were seen as crucial to the success of their study of the child.

There are many ways in which we might assess *The PSOC*'s impact upon our understanding of children. One avenue is fairly straightforward: How do the articles that have appeared in the pages of *The PSOC* stand up over time? Which nuggets have proven valuable, and which have been discarded? How do the papers in volume 1 appear to us now, seventy years later?

What follows is a personal assessment of *The PSOC*'s first volume, seen through the eyes of a child analyst whose education, training, and subsequent career have included constant interaction among psycho analysis

and the “neighboring fields” referenced by *The PSOC*'s first editors. Idiosyncratic though this review may be, it nonetheless shines a bit of light on where we started from and how we got from there to where we are now in our understanding of “the child.” It also may help us to chart a course for our field and profession in the years ahead.

Looking Back

From the very beginning the editors of *The PSOC* gathered the papers published within its pages under general headings; this was an attempt to highlight the points of contact among the papers. The twenty-five papers that appeared in volume 1 were gathered under six headings:

Genetic Problems

Problems of Child Analysis and Child Development

Guidance Work

Problems of Education

Problems of Group Life

Surveys and Comments

The section heading “Genetic Problems” requires some explanation to a twenty-first-century readership. The section itself has nothing to do with genes but instead reflects the early and enduring psychoanalytic interest in the *genesis* of the *psyche*, in both its normal and abnormal configurations. Today this might be headed, “Contributions to Psychoanalytic Developmental Theory.”

The section opens with Heinz Hartmann and Ernst Kris's classic paper, “The Genetic Approach in Psycho analysis.” Hartmann and Kris contrast dynamic and genetic perspectives and note how observational research provides important data that can't be obtained via psychoanalysis, especially in the child's preverbal period. Today they might have some interesting discussions with psycho analysts who work with infants (for example, Salomonsson, 2014[1]); some would

say that improved attunement and observational skills on the part of analysts have contracted the terra incognita of the preverbal period, which Hartmann and Kris accepted as a given.

[1] *Salomonsson argues that from birth onward (if not earlier), infants actively create mental representations—he calls them primal representations—of their experiences. These primal representations are embedded in the infants' affects as well as in their patterns of interaction with the world around them (both inanimate and interpersonal) and develop within a flow of experience that makes sense to the infant (and is experienced as pleasurable)— or that doesn't (and thus creates a wordless anxiety).*

The main points made by Hartmann and Kris remain as valid now as they were seventy years ago. They emphasize that externally similar behaviors can have very different underlying causes (dynamic and/or genetic) and that similar internal dynamic conflicts can produce quite different external behaviors as they interact with a particular person's biology, history, and environment.

It is impressive and reassuring to see how the bio-psycho-social perspective already was a solid part of psychoanalytic thinking from the very first pages of *The PSOC.* It also is worth mentioning that when Hartmann and Kris touch on theoretical conflicts with Jung, Rank, Klein, and Horney, they are more open-minded in their appreciation of those alternative perspectives than many other psycho analysts were in the decades that followed.

Phyllis Greenacre's paper, “The Biologic Economy of Birth,” is a speculative piece that requires a good bit of rethinking 70 years later, given the advances in medical instrumentation that now allow monitoring of the intrauterine environment and the physiologic changes that occur during the process of birth, monitoring that was not possible in 1945. Greenacre poses a question: Does a person's specific experience of birth result in long-term psychological effects upon him or her as a child and adult?[2]

Greenacre answers her question in the affirmative based upon the fact that she was able to reconstruct, in the analyses of some of her adult patients, fairly specific experiences of their births that became important organizers of their psychic lives. She suggests that psychoanalysts have overlooked such links because our own birth experiences elicit anxiety that we prefer to ignore.

An element of Greenacre's paper that suffers from our modern knowledge of neurology is the suggestion that the massage of the head (and the rest of the

body) that occurs during the infant's progress through the birth canal leads to myelinization of specific parts of the brain. Working from a drive model, she then goes on to suggest that birth traumata can create “a vulnerable focus for the later castration anxiety” (p. 47). The hypotheses she raises regarding the impact of the birth experience upon brain development today might be reexamined by our neuropsychoanalytic colleagues who have so helpfully clarified the phenomenon of infantile amnesia, pointing out that the neural structures underpinning autobiographical memory remain immature

[2] *Surprisingly, Greenacre avoids any reference to Otto Rank's (1924) speculations regarding the psychological impact of the experience of birth.*

up until four years of age (Solms and Turnbull, 2002). Thus, some of Greenacre's 1945 speculations do not hold up well in 2015.

In contrast, René Spitz's famous paper, “Hospitalism—An Inquiry into the Genesis of Psychiatric Conditions in Early Childhood,” remains as important now as it was when it first appeared. This was a groundbreaking piece of work in (1) its objective methods (film, developmental quotients), (2) its appreciation of the developmental consequences of the solitary confinement of infants, and (3) its integration of *child developmental* and *psychoanalytically informed direct observations* of infants.

The health and development of 130 institutionalized children—69 living in a prison “nursery” and 61 placed in a “foundling home”—were followed for more than a year. Those in the prison nursery were cared for by a full-time caretaker (often their own mother), while those in the foundling home were cared for by a nurse who was also responsible for 7 other infants. The infants in the prison nursery had frequent, day-long interaction with their caretakers, while those in the foundling homes spent long periods of isolation in cribs that were shielded from one another by sheets. The developmental quotients of the prison nursery children rose slightly over the first year, while the developmental quotients of the foundling-home children dropped dramatically over the same span. An epidemic of measles swept the foundling home (but not the prison nursery) and 26 percent of the children under age 2.5 years died, as contrasted with a 0.5 percent mortality rate from measles for children living in the community surrounding the foundling home.

Spitz concluded:

> *It will be necessary to take into consideration in our institutions, in our charitable activities, in our social legislation, the overwhelming and unique importance of adequate and satisfactory mother-child relationship during the first year, if we want to decrease the unavoidable and irreparable psychiatric consequences deriving from neglect during this period. (Spitz, 1945, p. 72)*

It is worth underlining the fact that in this paper, Spitz cited work by Charlotte Bühler, Loretta Bender, Gessell and Ilg, and many other developmental psychologists; he was willing and able to draw from the "neighboring fields" mentioned by *The PSOC* editors in their preface. He later carried this attitude with him to Denver, where he mentored researchers such as Robert Emde (1988a, 1988b) as they integrated child developmental and psychoanalytic perspectives in their studies of the developmental challenges of infancy and early childhood.

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Edward Glover's "Examination of the Klein System of Child Psychology" takes us far from the empiricism that marked René Spitz's paper on hospitalism. Glover's essay reprises the "controversial discussions" (see King and Steiner, 1991) that roiled the British Psychoanalytical Society during World War II. Glover puts forth his own version of Klein, which seems slanted toward making her seem ridiculously dependent upon her own fantasies and those she elicited from young children.

Glover's citation of Melitta Schmideberg's criticisms of Klein—especially this one —

> *... that the neglect of reality factors and the stress laid on the "good mother" implies an idealization of the mother-child relation and neglect of the ambivalence of both mother and child in more real levels. (Glover, 1945, p. 92)*

is remarkable in its silence regarding the enactment of the viciously ambivalent relationship between Schmideberg and Klein (who in real life were daughter and mother) during the controversial discussions.[3]

Glover specifically criticizes the Kleinian use of "fantasy" as very different from Freud's use of that term. While in Freud's thinking fantasy is a later achievement, in Klein's view (as represented by Isaacs [1943/1948] in Glover's paper) fantasy is operative from infancy and is organized along specific lines that merit identification as oedipal, paranoid-schizoid, depressive, and sadistic.

Klein and her colleagues succeeded in getting analysts to think more about what might go on in the developing minds of infants and very young children; they were willing, however, to accept as data some material that Glover regarded as nothing more than imagination.

Glover criticizes how the Kleinian analyst Paula Heimann (1943) tended to equate psychological processes, such as introjection and projection, with bodily activities, such as incorporation and expulsion. Current philosophers (for example, Lakoff and Johnson, 2003) have described how the mind creates itself around the body and its experiences, but they still maintain a difference between mental and physical processes. This distinction is one that sometimes is blurred in the Kleinian writing of that era, which Glover referred to as "a new religious biology" (p. 107). He closes his essay with this jab:

[3]*Glover also omits the fact that Schmideberg was his analysand—not something that could be shared publically but certainly suggestive of a complicated relationship between analyst and analysand. He also does not mention that Schmideberg's first analyst, when she was still a child, was her mother, Melanie Klein.*

> *In my opinion the concept of a three-month-old love trauma due to the infant's imagined greedy destruction of a real loving mother whom it really loves is a variant of the doctrine of Original Sin. (p. 117)*

Looking back from where we are now, we might say that Glover could not accept the fact that the Kleinian focus on pre-oedipal issues was an important addition to psychoanalytic thinking about children. At the same time, we might also say that this Kleinian theorizing now requires some revision in the light of recent neurodevelopmental research (and here I again have in mind, as an example, Solms and Turnbull's [2002] recasting of infantile amnesia as a function of neural immaturity rather than of repression).

"Notes on the Analytic Discovery of a Primal Scene," by Marie Bonaparte, is quite a contrast from all that has gone before in this first section of volume 1 of *The PSOC.* It is a kind of palimpsest, a fragment from an analysis that illustrates a number of theoretical points. As such, it highlights the workings of memory, of repression, and of the ways in which instincts and their vicissitudes regularly color perception and memory.

Bonaparte melds her interpretation of her analysand's dream with her reading of a series of stories written by her patient during childhood; together they lead

Bonaparte to reconstruct a primal-scene experience by her analysand that dated back to her first two years of life.

Bonaparte's interpretations seem to be built around her own associations, in line with then-current psychoanalytic theory. The reported confirmation of the reality of the reconstructed primal scene, obtained from an alleged participant in the primal scene some forty years later, seems facile, contrived, and perhaps even extorted. Analysts today most likely would not privilege theory in this way, choosing instead to stay closer to data derived from the analysis itself.[4]

The second section in this first volume of *The PSOC*, entitled "Problems of Child Analysis and Child Development," opens with another famous paper, Anna Freud's "Indications for Child Analysis." Working from a perspective that combines classical drive theory and its libidinal stages with an appreciation of the ego and its adaptive development of defenses, Miss Freud begins with a systematic review of the various reasons why *child* psycho analysis has met with resistance—from the outside world and, at times, from within the psychoanalytic community as well.

[4] *This brings to mind Charcot's famous bon mot, quoted by Freud in his translation of Charcot's lectures: "La théorie, c'est bon, mais ça n'empêche pas d'exister" (Theory is nice, but it doesn't trump facts.)*

In 1945 society in general preferred to ignore or deny the significance of sexuality in childhood; coupled with this was the common fear that psychoanalytic treatment would unleash problematic behaviors in a young patient: the child's ego and superego would be overrun. Some psycho analysts objected to child analysis on the grounds that (1) children do not cooperate with the injunction to free associate, and (2) they do not provide associations to their dreams. Furthermore, (3) children do not use the couch, and (4) they frequently combine words and actions in ways that adult analysts find disconcerting. Finally, (5) it is impossible to treat children without involving their parents— an involvement that would be seen as an unfortunate contaminant in adult analysis.

Some analysts questioned whether a transference neurosis was possible in child analysis (given the very real presence of the child's parents in his or her daily life); and while some child analysts thought that a child's play could be interpreted as a kind of projective device, open to interpretations of defenses and the impulses that lay behind them, there was controversy about when one

might begin analysis with a child. Kleinians were willing to begin such work with preverbal children; Anna Freud and her colleagues preferred to wait until words were firmly established and the Oedipus complex was in play. And while Kleinians were generally in favor of analytic treatment for *all* children, Anna Freud preferred to reserve such treatment for children who were obviously crippled by a neurosis.

Miss Freud pointed out that many symptomatic children do not experience much in the way of neurotic suffering; the suffering is visited instead upon the parents. The child, once he or she has erected a workable defense against the anxiety associated with a neurotic conflict, prefers to leave sleeping dogs lie. The question of whether to embark upon analytic treatment then often turns on the degree to which the child's normal developmental capacities have been compromised by an internal conflict. Is this a temporary halt or regression in development, one that developmental pressures may unblock without analytic treatment? Or has so much libidinal energy been fixated on the conflict that the child cannot move forward without analytic assistance?

Like her father, Miss Freud did not advocate for analytic intervention without serious reasons for undertaking that task. She writes:

> *An infantile neurosis can be ... [viewed] as a transitory disorder as long as the libido organization of the child remains fluid and shows progressive tendencies.... When the libido constellations become rigid, stabilized and monotonous in their expressions the neurosis is in danger of remaining permanently. This means that treatment is indicated.*

> *This view, that child analysis should be used only in cases where there is slight or no hope for a spontaneous recovery, is opposed to that of many analysts who hold that child analysis may be used prophylactically to remove the pathogenic fixation points. (A. Freud, 1945, pp. 140-141)*

Miss Freud was arguing for a narrow scope for child analysis; it was a technique to be used only when neurotic interferences in ego development were such that a child's overall developmental progress was in jeopardy.

The view Miss Freud put forth in 1945— of an ego that starts out as

> *... a mere receiving station for dimly perceived stimuli into an organized center where impressions are received, sorted out, recorded, interpreted, and where appropriate action is undertaken. (p. 142)*

is at variance with the many ego capacities that developmental psychologists have subsequently demonstrated in infants and young children. Today's psycho analysts are aware of many ways in which a child actively organizes his or her perceptions of the world in what Hartmann (1939/1958) had already begun to describe as the conflict-free sphere of development.

Miss Freud's description of the various ways in which the ego goes about defending itself from the anxiety aroused by internal conflicts (between impulses and prohibitions) is an elegant reprise of her earlier volume, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence* (1936/1968). This includes a brief discussion of the relationship between repression and infantile amnesia, which would be seen rather differently today, given what we have learned about the neurobiological underpinnings of this phenomenon in subsequent years (Solms and Turnbull, 2002).

Perhaps one of the most forward-looking aspects of this essay by Miss Freud is its insistence that childhood pathology must be measured against *normal child development*, not against adult criteria or any other fixed norms. Her emphasis on the importance of normal development would fully flower, twenty years later, in her volume *Normality and Pathology in Childhood: Assessments of Development* (1965).

The remaining four essays in this section on “Problems of Child Analysis and Child Development” are quite variable in their topics and length.

Berta Bornstein's “Clinical Notes on Child Analysis” is a description, with accompanying case illustrations, of some of the technical challenges faced by child analysts in their work with young children.

Bornstein notes how children usually come to treatment against their will; they are not suffering as much as the others in their environment

are pained by the children's behavior. Their first impulse is to run from any confrontation with their conflicts, and the analyst is thus seen as dangerous; Bornstein quotes a little girl patient: “The minute I saw you I knew that I was trapped” (Bornstein, 1945, p. 152).

Bornstein describes a preparatory period in which the child analyst tries to interest the child in what the analyst might have to offer, moving from external compliance (sometimes via a kind of seduction) toward an internal willingness to make use of the analyst and her skills. The presence of the child's parents interferes with the creation of a transference neurosis, but transference manifestations are nonetheless common. And although free association is absent, Bornstein accepts play as a partial substitute for that tool.

Bornstein takes the position that early interpretation of defenses— and especially of impulses—is unwise; fools rush in where angels fear to tread. Instead, her first goal is to get to know the child, and she especially wants to avoid the danger of undermining the healthy, ego-building aspects of play by offering premature interpretations that would make conscious the ties between that play and previously unconscious libidinal and aggressive impulses.

Bornstein includes several examples of work with children in which the analysis of defense leads quite smoothly and naturally to subsequent interpretation of underlying impulses. I found myself understanding why Bornstein was such a sought-after supervisor: her attitude toward her patients seems encouraging, and she avoids (as far as possible) making them feel demeaned or defective. If she brought those same skills to supervision, she would be very popular indeed.

The third paper in this section—Emmy Sylvester's “Analysis of Psychogenic Anorexia and Vomiting in a Four-Year-Old Child”—is remarkable for several reasons. First, Sylvester (who never gives this four-year-old little girl a name—I will call her Chloe) takes her into treatment in an inpatient setting, where she was seen daily over seven months (minus two vacations by the analyst— one for two weeks and the other for five weeks). There is absolutely no mention of work with Chloe's parents, though it is clear that over the course of the analysis, Sylvester opened up all sorts of doors (especially regarding Chloe's infantile sexual theories) that might be problematic when Chloe returned home (she was the third of five children, with an older brother and sister as well as a younger brother and sister).

Sylvester and Chloe played together, and Chloe very quickly used dolls to dramatize scenes that might have been taken from Greek mythology, with grown-ups killing and eating children and vice versa. This play seemed to give Chloe some much-needed psychic *lebensraum*, and

she then began to use words as well as play, verbalizing first pre-oedipal and, later, oedipal themes. It is worth mentioning that Sylvester, in the context of the analysis, took the opportunity to teach Chloe some of her own skills—sewing, drawing, and building—as ways for Chloe to take in some aspects of the analyst … and thus to develop some ego capacities that not only would make her feel good about herself in the present but also would serve her well in the future.

Sylvester's paper provides us with some useful examples of how it's possible to communicate with a young child via play, using it to first approach defenses and then anxiety-eliciting impulses in a way that Chloe found tolerable. It is a revealing snapshot of child analysis as it was developing in Chicago in 1940.

Kate Friedlander's paper, “Formation of the Antisocial Character,” takes us in quite a different direction. She opens by opposing a now-outmoded idea of the time regarding antisocial behavior—that it is due to some innate defect similar to the “neuropathic heredity” that Jean-Martin Charcot (1889/2013) originally assumed lay beneath the disorder termed “hysteria.” She straightforwardly links kleptomania in women with penis envy, and ties other more generic criminal activity to “unconscious feelings of guilt arising out of the oedipal conflict” (Friedlander, 1945, p. 189). Findings like these allow her to discredit the conception of the “born criminal” (p. 190) and to open up the field of delinquency to psychoanalytic examination; in this she was following in the footsteps of one of her Viennese mentors, August Aichhorn (1925).

Friedlander introduces us to Billy, a seven-year-old boy whom she saw in analysis for two years. Billy had been used as a pawn in an ongoing marital conflict that led to his parents' separation when Billy was six. After this separation

> *… the boy became the storm center for their quarrels and he, on his part, played one parent off against the other, taking bribes from both. (p. 192)*

Friedlander conceptualizes Billy's aggressive behavior as a way of dealing with castration anxiety and a defense against passive homosexual wishes toward his father; it also fit in well with his sadomasochistic relationship with his mother. She thinks that Billy's superego formation had been compromised by

> *… a constant alternation between an over-intense mother-child relationship with too much gratification on the one hand and, on the other, too abrupt a separation of the child from the mother when too severe frustrations are imposed. (p. 202)*

In the background was the fact that Billy's parents were often unrestrained in their own behavior while, at the same time, prohibiting their children “from acting out their aggressive and sexual tendencies within the family” (p. 202).

Friedlander offers us another seven-year-old boy, Peter, as a contrast to Billy. “Peter's conscience was in the process of becoming independent, that is to say, internalized” (p. 197). She writes:

> *Both boys were very difficult to handle: Peter, because he suffered from fear whenever his mother went out and because he was absorbed in daydreams and difficulties with other boys; Billy, because he lacked any incentive to conform to the wishes of the world if they ran counter to his instinctual drives. He could not tolerate postponement but had to satisfy all his wishes, whether or not they were antisocial. Of course Billy had his own unconscious conflicts but it is significant that owing to the difference in ego and superego formation, these conflicts were expressed not in neurotic symptoms, but in antisocial behavior. (p. 199)*

Two boys both troublesome to those around them—one (Billy) had little evidence of superego formation, and the other (Peter) had at least some suggestions of internal conflict. Friedlander, following her mentor Aich horn, ends by suggesting that the first task in working with Billy will be to encourage an identification with an authority figure whom Billy sees as having some things (possessions and skills) that Billy wants; the second step will be helping Billy to develop some frustration tolerance; and if those steps are successful, perhaps some internalization of conscience will follow. In any case, the tasks encountered in working with Billy will be quite different from those posed by Peter. The distinction Friedlander makes remains as valid today as it was in 1945.

“Problems of Child Analysis and Child Development” ends with Dorothy Burlingham's “The Fantasy of Having a Twin.” This brief paper is reminiscent of many other short contributions to the early psychoanalytic literature; their authors report everyday phenomena that take on new meanings when examined under a psychoanalytic lens.

Burlingham makes the case that the fantasy of having a twin may fulfill many different psychological functions, and she goes on to describe some of these. She puts at their center the

> *... reaction to the disappointment in love that is experienced during the oedipal phase.... The twin is conjured up ... to take the place of the lost love-object and so to alleviate suffering. (Burlingham, 1945, p. 207)*

In addition, Burlingham suggests that the conjured twin may provide companionship; he or she may embody abilities the child feels are missing in oneself; the twin may be an avenue for narcissism, may be a way

to double one's own powers, or may express one or the other side of an internal conflict. Each of Burlingham's suggestions makes sense and stands as a reminder that any psychic phenomenon (such as the fantasy of having a twin) may serve multiple functions within a single child, and different functions across different children. In some ways she was anticipating Kohut's (1971) appreciation of the adaptive potential implicit in the psychological phenomenon of twinship.

The third segment of this first volume of *The PSOC* is devoted to what the editors call “Guidance Work.” The four papers in this section represent ways in which psychoanalytically informed clinicians were applying their skills to some specific practical situations encountered in everyday child rearing.

The first paper, “The Uncompromising Demand of a Three-Year-Old for Her Own Mother” by Eleanor Pavenstedt and Irene Andersen, is *painful* to read, as it takes the reader back to a time when, for example, a child who was sucking her thumb was—like three-year-old Betty—fitted with aluminum mitts that made this an impossibility. Toilet training was begun at six or seven months, and when this proved unsuccessful, Betty was tied down to the potty and given suppositories. Placed in a foster home at eighteen months because her own mother was busy taking care of other infants in a maternity home, Betty bounced among three foster families for the next two years until she finally was placed in a residential center.

This is a story of a repeatedly neglected, abused, and displaced or mal placed child who persistently objected to her abuse in any way she could. Today we might say that the agency responsible for Betty's foster placements was misguided and inappropriate and that the foster mothers provided nothing more than a semblance of care, quite deficient in emotional nurturance. The attempt to make Betty more malleable to her malplacements via the introduction of a psychotherapist seems painfully misguided; to her credit,

Betty refused to engage with this additional person in her life. Betty was clear in her actions and words: she did not want a therapist; she wanted her Mummy!

John Bowlby's (1969) work on attachment was still two decades in the future, but Betty's story illustrates how desperately and relentlessly this little girl sought to maintain her attachment to her mother and, when her mother was unavailable, to create a substitute mothering relationship with Ms. A. The latter was a social worker-cum-therapist in the residential center where Betty spent a significant amount of time before finally returning to live with her mother, new stepfather, and new half sister.

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Hyman Lippman's paper titled “The Use of Dreams in Psychiatric Work with Children” is an attempt to scavenge psychological knowledge from some dreams reported by children. Lippman's attributions sometimes seem naive and at the same time a bit grandiose:

> *In the case of oedipus dreams the wish is often obvious in the manifest dream.... It goes without saying that such material is never interpreted to the child. (Lippman, 1945, p. 239)*

Lippman's attitude suggests that the psycho analyst has some special knowledge that allows him to peer beneath the surface of the dream, going to depths that would be dangerous to take the child.

Later, after describing a dream reported by a twelve-year-old boy in which an identification with Nazis appeared in the boy's associations to his dream, Lippman writes:

> *It is well to caution the reader again that the manner in which this dream was handled should be confined to the experienced analyst who is doing psychiatric work with children. (p. 245)*

Here we again encounter an image of the analyst as a powerful seer —and Lippman adds a caution that strikes a discordant note to modern ears:

> *The psychiatric social worker who has been analyzed is in the same position as the non-analyzed therapist with regard to the interpretation of unconscious material in dreams. He does have the advantage of a certain familiarity with dream material through his own analysis and will therefore be more alert to hidden meanings in dreams. He will also have learned the wisdom of staying away from material that will threaten the patient. (p. 245)*

Margarete Ruben's “A Contribution to the Education of a Parent” can be seen as a foreshadowing of the “treatment via the parent” model developed later by Anni Katan, Erna Furman, and their colleagues at the Cleveland Center for Research in Child Development and the Hanna Perkins Center (see Furman, 1981). Ruben describes her work with the mother of two girls, Henny (age 9) and Eva (age 5), during the period when Ruben was treating Henny in psycho analysis.

Ruben describes how she helped the mother to tolerate Eva's (and Mother's own) anxieties about instinctual matters; this then allowed Eva a bit more wiggle room for development. Mother provided Ruben with notes regarding Eva's behavior; Ruben gathered these together under several headings:

The wish for masculinity

The sadistic conception of sexual intercourse

Eva's pregenital theories of procreation

Emancipation from the mother

Conflicts during the oedipal phase

Looking back on both the mother's observations of Eva as well as Ruben's conjectures regarding their meaning, it appears that Ruben was very helpful to the mother in providing her with a kind of structure (Sigmund Freud might have called it a mythology[5]) that helped Mother contain her own anxieties about Eva's sexual curiosities and actions. Ruben views all of Eva's behaviors via the psychoanalytic theory of the day, in ways that confirm the theory—especially the part played by penis envy. This material now would get quite a different reading by many analysts (see Grossman and Stewart, 1976). However, it still appears that Ruben's work was helpful to Mother and to Eva as they negotiated the currents and riptides of childhood sexuality.

The section on “Guidance Work” is brought to a close by Emanuel Klein's paper, “The Reluctance to Go to School.” This paper might be titled: “The Analyst as Know-It-All.” It ends with this summary:

> *Acute dread of going to school occurs in children with strong castration anxiety, great masturbation guilt, and repressed aggressive impulses toward a parent on whom they are greatly dependent. These children are fixated at the oedipal or pre-oedipal level. An increase of*

> *tension in the school reactivates a regressive dread of the primitive punitive parent, projected on to the teacher and school, which frightens the child away from the school. An increase in sexual longing, fear or guilt toward the parents, reactivates the oedipal or pre-oedipal fear of sexual injury of the mother, injury to the mother by a projected aspect of the child's oral-sadistic impulse, or desertion by the mother: these anxieties draw the child to the mother. School failure becomes tied to masturbation guilt and fear of loss of love; shame about school failure reactivates a paranoid shame at inability to control one's sexual impulse. (Klein, 1945, pp. 278-279)*

Quite a devil's dictionary of pathology!

Klein mentions that some of the children who refuse to go to school are beaten as punishment for their obstinate behavior but that the beatings do not have an effect; he seems to see these beatings as quite ordinary and unworthy of comment. More troubling is the fact that Klein's conceptualization of school refusal is centered entirely in the individual child and his or her fantasy life. As an analyst, I am loathe to ignore a child's fantasy life; but a cursory reading of the case of seven-year-old John suggests that John was being used by his mother

[5] *"The theory of the instincts is so to say our mythology" (S. Freud, 1933, p. 95).*

as a contraceptive device: as long as he stayed home, she was unlikely to get pregnant.

Klein's description of nine-year-old Mary today would lead many clinicians to suspect ongoing sexual abuse (or at least overstimulation) within the family:

> *Mary tried to get on the doctor's lap to make sexual advances, to expose herself. There was an adult flirtatiousness and provocativeness that one would expect only in an older sex delinquent. This child gave evidence of persistent spying on the parents, watching for a chance to see her father in the nude, much surreptitious use of rouge and nail polish, and a receptivity to sex experiences with an adult. Investigation revealed that the child's provocative behavior was a result of identification with her mother. (p. 269)*

My own experience suggests that there was much more going on here than an identification with the mother, and whatever it was, it probably was not limited

to Mary's fantasy life. Unfortunately, Klein is fully committed to explaining his cases in terms of the children's intrapsychic life alone, with nary a glance toward the environment within which they are living. Again, my own experience suggests that "school phobia" is often a misnomer; many children who refuse to go to school are actually refusing to leave home. And many of those children who refuse to leave home have very good reason for their refusal, such as a *realistic* fear that something bad might happen to a loved one at home while the children are away at school.

The social reformist or even revolutionary thinking that was common among many of the early psycho analysts appears clearly in the fourth section of this first volume of *The PSOC*, headed "Problems of Education."

Otto Fenichel, in his paper "The Means of Education," is quick to point out that

> *... attempts to reform educational systems will be unsuccessful ... as long as the existing social order requires maintenance of the old educational institution in its own interest. (Fenichel, 1945, p. 282)*

Fenichel asserts that "authoritarian" societies value submissive obedience, while "democratic" societies value independence, self-reliance, and active mastery. He then adds capitalism to the mix, and things quickly get more complicated, for Fenichel sees capitalism as intensifying "anal-sadistic striving" while discouraging and thwarting "genital sexuality" (p. 292).

Here it is worth recalling that Fenichel was deeply involved in Viennese socialist politics after World War I. This was the era of the German Society of Proletarian Sexual Politics, "Sex-Pol" (see Danto, 2005), which counted many psycho analysts as members and sought to liberate the masses from economic, social, political, and sexual repression. Fenichel argues, at the end of this paper, that counter-instinctual forces in society are fed by the subterranean instincts (sexual in nature, both pre-oedipal and oedipal) and, at the same time, seek to keep these instincts from expressing themselves openly.

In contrast to this state of affairs, Fenichel's hope is that the "rigid and instinct-like superego" that represents a child's first attempt to master his impulses will be "subsequently replaced by the mastering of impulses by a reasonable ego" (p. 287). Thus, psycho analysis, when applied to education, will bring a kind of flexibility (of thinking and of character) that stands in contrast to the thought and behavior inculcated by the traditional, conservative, and authoritarian

modes of education that were common in Europe and America during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Fenichel's highly abstract essay is followed by a contribution by Willie Hoffer that brings us back down to earth. Entitled “Psychoanalytic Education,” it is Hoffer's attempt to apply psychoanalytic insights to the everyday tasks of ordinary childhood education.

Hoffer describes how some modes of education have been problematic from a psychoanalytic point of view:

> *... education played a double role in the evolution of neuroses: on the one hand, by stimulation of infantile sexuality during the normal processes of growth, and on the other, by suppression of their most direct manifestations; the former possibly leading to the formation of fixations, the latter to repression and other mechanisms of shutting out instinctual demands from consciousness. The Scylla and Charybdis of all education, over-indulgence and over-frustration, were established. (Hoffer, 1945, p. 300)*

Hoffer knows whereof he speaks; once psycho analysis had pointed out some of the ways in which repression could be problematic, some psychoanalytically influenced parents and educators began to experiment with educational methods that were intended to minimize repression. These, however, were often disastrous; children raised in such environments came to regard “[t]raffic policemen and park keepers ... as main public enemies” (p. 302). It took some time before these psychoanalytic pioneers came to realize that

> *... the alternative to the old-fashioned neglect or denial of infantile sexuality is not to admit its existence and then leave the child alone with his various drives. (p. 303)*

Instead,

> *... emphasis has now been shifted from the role of the instincts to the role of the immature ego. (p. 304)*

This approach stood in dramatic contrast to that advocated by Melanie Klein and her followers, wherein the focus was on early interpretation of instinctual impulses rather than on the development and consolidation of the ego capacities needed to harness the instincts and their derivatives.

Hoffer's paper is echoed by Editha Sterba's contribution, “Interpretation and Education.” Sterba notes how, in the first years after psychoanalysis began illuminating the realm of the unconscious, educators influenced by its insights saw repression as bad, anxiety as bad, and factual information about sexual life as good:

> *The ego was to be spared the necessity of repression; it was thought that through interpretation the energy of the id would be put entirely at the disposal of the ego. (Sterba, 1945, p. 309)*

Unfortunately the law of unintended consequences intervened.

Sterba describes Henry, a four-and-a-half-year-old boy who

> *... came from an open-minded and analytically-versed environment.... The parents tried to spare their intelligent and precocious child every kind of trauma; they avoided restriction and frustration, inquired into every one of the boy's questions and ideas, and treated him like an adult. They had of course explained the facts of life to him in great detail. They attempted to understand the underlying causes of each of Henry's impulses and felt it incumbent upon themselves to tell him immediately “the meaning” of anything he made or did. (p. 310)*

However,

> *In spite of the interpretation and the parents' affirmative attitude toward his drives, or rather because of these two influences, the child's relationship toward the parents was obviously neurotic. (p. 313)*

Sterba makes an important distinction between adult and child analysis. When interpreting previously unconscious material to an adult patient, one can (usually) assume the availability of well-consolidated ego capacities and defense mechanisms. In the case of child analysis, these ego capacities and defenses are still *in statu nascendi.* It is this difference that Henry's parents ignored:

> *Through misdirected interpretation the ego was pushed up against a wall; it had no other recourse in its helplessness than to take refuge in pathological defense mechanisms, chiefly in the form of aggression towards the educating and interpreting person, and in anxiety reactions. (p. 316)*

In Sterba's view, psychoanalytic interpretation—and especially interpretation by educators—should be used sparingly,

> *... only where it is assumed that the child would not overcome his instinctual difficulties without their being brought to consciousness, and that [without such analytic intervention] he would be forced to have recourse to pathological outlets. (pp. 316-317)*

In such situations Sterba sees psychoanalytic interpretation as

> *... nothing more than an educational act, a demand for progress from the pleasure to the reality principle.... The recognition of unconscious contents and the communication of these to the child makes it easier for the educator to help the child's ego in the struggle against the instincts and to offer him other possibilities of discharge and sublimation. (p. 316)*

“Problems of Group Life” is the heading for the penultimate section of this first volume of *The PSOC*, and it contains papers by three well-known figures in the history of child analysis: Erik Erikson, Edith Buxbaum, and Fritz Redl.

Erikson's paper—”Childhood and Tradition in Two American Indian Tribes”—is an early version of the chapters on the Sioux and the Yurok that are an important component of his classic work, *Childhood and Society* (1950/1963). A precursor of what became the “Six cultures” studies of child rearing and personality initiated by Whiting and Child in 1953, Erikson's essay is an attempt to draw links (using the psychoanalytic theories of the time) between tribal child-rearing practices and “national character”—in this case the normative behaviors of adult Sioux and Yurok Indians.

While this kind of thinking may illuminate some cultural practices that would otherwise remain opaque to an outsider, it is fraught with danger: it is far too easy to draw links that are reasonable conjectures but that remain just so—conjectures.[6] What is more, it ignores the common finding that *intragroup* variability often exceeds *intergroup* variability. That is, there actually are many ways of being a Sioux hunter, only some of which fit with Erikson's attempt to apply psychoanalytic insights to cultural practices. There may be even more variability among Sioux

[6] *Bertram Lewin's essay on Bateson and Mead's (1942) Balinese Character, which appears later in volume 1, is another example of this kind of thinking.*

men (or among Yurok men) than the variability seen when comparing the class of Sioux men with the class of Yurok men.

This weakness in Erikson's argument is illuminated when, close to the end of the essay, he turns his attention to another group:

> *It was customary in some psychiatric circles in Europe to discuss what appeared to be a relative "ego weakness" in American patients. There are indications that in the depths of their hearts American neurotics, beyond seeking relief for guilt and inferiority feelings, desire to be cured of a basic vagueness and confusion in their identifications. Often they turn to psycho analysis as a savior from the discrepancies of American life; abroad, they were willing to dissimulate their American identity for the sake of what promised to be a more comfortable one, made in "the old country." (Erikson, 1945, p. 348)*

Many of us will instinctively recoil against this kind of lumping together of "American patients," since we know very well how much they vary; we are not quite so quick to notice when "the Sioux" or "the Yurok" are treated in the same way.

Erikson offers us a little gem, however, when he comments on the motivations that attract people (both patients and practitioners) to psycho analysis:

> *In the course of a psycho analysis patients repeat in transferences and regressions not only infantile instinctual tensions and ego defenses, but also their abortive (and often unconscious) infantile ego-ideals. These are often based on conditions and slogans which prevailed at the period of the family's greatest ascendancy. Specific conflicts and resistances result: the patient, on the one hand, is afraid that the brittleness of his ideal identity will be uncovered; on the other, he wishes the psychoanalyst, no matter with what means or terminologies, to free him from the ambiguity of his background and to provide him with the deceptive continuity of a magic psychoanalytic world.*
>
> *This, however, is not the social function of psycho analysis. (p. 349)*

Edith Buxbaum's paper, "Transference and Group Formation in Children and Adolescents," highlights the ways in which children make use of groups at different points in their development. Groups are particularly important to children who are moving out of the immediate orbit of the family into the world of school (that is, at ages five to seven), and they become important again as

children abandon their fealty to parental norms and ideals and attempt to work out norms and ideals that are (to some extent) independent from those of their parents (that is, during the adolescent years).

In Buxbaum's view, at both of these ages “castration fear forces [children] into group-formation” (Buxbaum, 1945, p. 362). Here she is

highlighting the sense of vulnerability that is common to children at both of these transition points. Children who are entering school use the group to expand and enhance their ego capacities; each plays his own cognitive growth off against that of his peers, to their mutual benefit. In contrast, the adolescent is faced with changes in the content of the superego; one sees a swinging back and forth between submission and revolt. The group “helps him at the critical point in his development, in his physical and emotional breaking away from home” (p. 364).

This section comes to a close with a paper that could hardly be more relevant in today's world: Fritz Redl's “The Psychology of Gang Formation and the Treatment of Juvenile Delinquents.”

Redl begins his essay by asking “Which delinquents are we talking about?” (Redl, 1945, p. 367). He goes on to subdivide delinquent behavior into four subgroups. These include:

healthy individuals who do delinquent acts in reaction to external stressors;

youngsters who are confused in their growth;

youngsters who behave delinquently as part of a neurosis, or as a defense against a neurosis; and

“‘Genuine Delinquency’—by which we mean certain disturbances in the Impulse System of the individual, and/or malformations of ego, super ego and ego ideal, in intensity or content.” (p. 368)

Redl is especially concerned with members of this fourth group and how such an adolescent

> *... identifies with the one or other sub-group, the group code of which is not as prohibitive of some of his vital gratifications as the other seems to be. (p. 369)*

In work with such a youngster, one must attend to both the individual and to the subgroup, for these subgroups have devised special mechanisms by which they inoculate their members against the danger of being influenced by other groups and their norms.

Redl's conclusions deserve quotation in full:

Psychotherapy with delinquent juveniles, even if operating on the traditional interview basis, must not operate entirely in "*group psychological midair.*"

It is essential for the individual therapist to have as thorough a diagnostic picture of the *group psychological characteristics* of the climate the youngster lives in as of the individual dynamics of the case.

For certain types of cases—especially those with highly developed "tabu against code-dangerous identifications," it is advisable to undertake treatment in a setting which combines group therapy with the individual

approach and in which the psychiatrist or his group therapeutic helper is part and parcel of the group in which the youngster lives.

It is desirable that group psychologically correct prescriptions be worked out by which *supportive treatment* in and through the group can be added to the work of the psychiatrist within or outside of institutional situations. Places where youngsters are being stored must not only comply with the best that is known in practice educationally and clinically, but they must absolutely obey the laws of *group psychological asepsis.* At this moment there is hardly a handful of such places in existence in the whole United States. (pp. 376-377; emphasis Redl's)

And in 2015 there *still* is hardly a handful of such places in existence in the whole United States! Much more common are institutions that reinforce individual delinquent behavior via powerful group norms— our so-called "juvenile justice system," with its training schools, reformatories, and prisons. Meanwhile gangs remain a reality in the daily lives of urban young people around the world.

The final section of this first volume of *The PSOC* is headed "Surveys and Comments" and is a bit of a grab bag of reviews of nonpsycho-analytic books and research.

Bertram Lewin reviews Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead's *Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis*. Lewin, as well as Bateson and Mead before

him, map psychoanalytic theory onto anthropological observations. While this would not be seen as good anthropology in 2015, at the time it was truly groundbreaking, and Bateson and Mead's volume was destined to become a classic in the field.

As with any anthropological study, details matter, and details are selected from an ocean of data. Bateson (who was the main photographer) and Mead selected those aspects of Balinese culture and behavior that they found remarkable, often along lines suggested by psychoanalytic theories of the day. Lewin ends his review with some psychoanalytic extrapolations regarding the presence or absence of an Oedipus complex among the Balinese (it seems absent) as well as a discussion of castration anxiety (which some aspects of Balinese child-rearing seems to encourage).

Katherine Wolf provides a survey of the literature regarding and titled "Evacuation of Children in Wartime," which is quite wide-ranging in character, covering 229 bibliographic entries. She introduces the topic with a discussion of the difficulties faced in wartime research and differentiates between (1) problems in adaptation, and (2) neurotic disorders. She notes that most evacuated children proved capable of a positive adaptation to their new billets.

Wolf then goes on to discuss the appearance of neuroses among some of the 735,000 children who were evacuated to the English countryside during World War II:

> *Neurosis formation induced by evacuation can be considered neither a developmental neurosis nor a traumatic neurosis in the strict sense of the word. The best illustration of the strange type of neurosis formation precipitated by evacuation can be found in the second part of Freud and Burlingham's War and Children: Children under the strain of separation develop habits which express an emotional attitude toward the situation, but which then lose their direct expressional value and gradually become symptoms in themselves. An example of such a transformation is the tic that poor little Patrick, aged three years and two months, developed. He did not want to cry but instead constantly assured himself, by nodding his head, that his mother would come to get him. (Wolf, 1945b, p. 393)*

Wolf opines that

> *... evacuation produces a process in the child's mental apparatus that in turn adapts this apparatus to a separation from the parents for an indefinite period. The child suspends his relationship to his parents for this given time. This creates a vagueness in his image of his home and probably produces a disturbance of his perceptive and imaginative processes in general. It expresses itself in a lack of concentration which is an almost uniform characteristic of evacuated children. This arrangement seems to make adaptation to evacuation fairly successful and explains the low incidence of neurosis formation in children who did not show neurotic symptoms prior to evacuation. (p. 397)*

She closes her article with a metaphor:

> *The child interpreted his role as a wartime guest very literally. He was only a guest, but a guest at a party, which was not of his choosing. Therefore he did not want to think too clearly of his losses. The child preferred to be a "War Time Guest" rather than a "Borrowed Child." In preserving his home somewhere in his mind, and in not allowing the new home to become a rival, the normal child from a normal home could adapt to the situation. (p. 398)*

Lillian Malcove's report on "Margaret E. Fries' Research in Problems of Infancy and Childhood" is an eye-opener. Fries—of whom I had not previously heard—was a pediatrician who, beginning about 1935, attempted to integrate psychological and social care into the Well Baby Clinic of the New York Infirmary for Women and Children. Interested in medical practice, research, and training, she decided early on that one could not appreciate abnormal development without studying normal development, and vice versa.

Fries's clinic provided some "psychoanalytic" care (though the dimensions of that care are not clear from this article) to mothers and their children; she was doing what we now would call "infant mental health" work long before Fraiberg (1980). She even developed her own behavioral test of infant-mother relatedness: her "Oral Test" required mothers to remove the nipple from their infants while nursing. Fries and her researchers then categorized the infants' reactions according to their response to this provocative frustration as active, moderately active, or quiet. She tried to predict, at the end of the then-typical ten-day "lying-in" period, the future development of the child ... including predictions about which infants might become schizophrenic! Fries suggested that the match or mismatch of parental and child temperament was an

important contributor to subsequent development, anticipating Chess and Thomas's (1985) work by decades.

Lawrence Kubie's two-page comment on Margaret Ribble's book *The Rights of Infants* supports Ribble's position that infants need attuned mothering care. However, he describes Ribble's attempts to use physiological data to support her psychological advice as a naive over-simplification.

This first volume of *The PSOC* comes to an end with a second review by Katherine Wolf, this time of Edouard Pichon's (1936) *Le developement psychologique de l'enfant et de l'adolescent*, a book that had some influence at the time among those interested in studying children. While Pichon apparently had some psychoanalytic inclinations, his contention that “A healthy person is not a person whose drives are free, but who is free from drives” (Wolf, 1945a, p. 418) seems very much at odds with the mainstream of psychoanalytic thought, both then and now.

Wolf sees Pichon as an interesting but basically misguided observer of child development, especially in his separation of the realms of emotion and intellect. Wolf characterizes Pichon's attempt to synthesize psychoanalysis with experimental child psychology as finalistic or normative in character (where, for example, the latency period is seen as proceeding toward a goal of “decarnalization” [p. 421] of thinking). In contrast, Wolf sees psycho analysis as proceeding causally, with development building from the ground upward.

Looking Forward

In some ways the first volume of *The PSOC* stands as a time capsule that provides us with a snapshot of psychoanalytic thinking about “the child” as it stood seven decades ago.

That thinking has expanded in several dimensions.

The main lines of psychoanalytic theory that appear in this volume are limited to those having to do with (1) the economy and development of the drives; (2) the structures of id, ego, and superego; and (3) the defense mechanisms.

Analysts today would want to include many additional strands in their thinking (Brinich, 2013).

Melanie Klein and her colleagues now would get a more sympathetic hearing (though even in this volume glimpses appear that suggest an appreciation of some of her ideas).

Meanwhile some of the psychoanalytic theorizing that appears in Greenacre's paper on the biological economy of birth, as well as in Bonaparte's reconstruction of a primal-scene experience, now would be viewed rather skeptically.

Psychoanalytic work with children has evolved to include work with parents and other important figures, coordinated with our usual child-focused efforts (for example, Novick and Novick, 2005).

Hopefully we now would be sensitive to some of the suggestions of physical and sexual abuse that appear in several of the case reports.

Most psycho analysts have come to appreciate and to incorporate data derived from nonanalytic methodologies—a goal implied by the vision statement put forth by *The PSOC*'s first editors. And we can hope that such collaboration with nonanalytic colleagues has diminished the grandiosity that comes through in the papers by Lippman and by Klein.

Contemporary analysts have come to appreciate how children (and adults) strive to create and maintain a sense of themselves—a “self”—that seeks coherence as a goal in itself, separate from the drives that were at the center of psychoanalytic thinking in 1945.

Analysts also have come to appreciate the complex systems within which individual development is embedded. Whether biological, psychological, or social, these interacting systems have pushed us in the direction of what Emde (1988a, 1988b) calls a “we-go” (instead of, or in addition to, an ego).

Systems theory also has us thinking in terms of emergent phenomena that do not follow linear trends but rather represent discontinuous transformations in development (Abrams, 2011; Knight, 2011; Olesker, 2011), where a new “whole” can emerge that is remarkably more than the sum of old parts.

The vocabulary of mentalization (Fonagy et al., 2002) now reinforces our appreciation of the complex systems in play as a child and his or her caretaker interact; this then leads to new pathways for therapeutic intervention.

Nonetheless, it is remarkable how many of the topics addressed in the first volume of *The PSOC* remain significant and topical today. I have in mind particularly the impact of neglect upon infant development, the impact of the displacements of war upon child development and adaptation, and the continued issue of gang formation as an adaptation in urban settings of social disadvantage.

These concerns highlight the degree to which we seem to have lost an important strand that appears most obviously in the papers by Fenichel, Hoffer, and Redl. This is the idea that psycho analysis, and psychoanalysts, exist within a social matrix that cannot be ignored. These early analysts saw psycho analysis as contributing as much to a reformation of society as to the relief of individuals. Sadly, over the past seventy years psycho analysis has become identified more with conformity and adaptation to the social environment than with the evolution and reform of social structures.

Can child analysis maintain and continue to elaborate its central interest in the *intrapsychic* life of the child as we grow in our appreciation of the biological, cognitive, and social dimensions that affect the development of children? Can psycho analysis in the twenty-first century reconnect to the reformist ideals that contributed greatly to its attractiveness in the first half of the twentieth century? The answers to these questions will have a great deal to do with the future of *The PSOC* ... and to that of child psychoanalysis in its many possible incarnations.

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