

## RACE, SELF-DISCLOSURE, AND "FORBIDDEN TALK": RACE AND ETHNICITY IN CONTEMPORARY CLINICAL PRACTICE

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*In this paper I attempt to extend the psychoanalytic conversation about race and ethnicity by discussing the intersubjectivity of race and racial difference. I present clinical material from an interracial treatment in which disclosures about race played an important role in deepening the clinical process. The resulting interactions permitted the patient to admit more of herself into the treatment space. I suggest that contemporary psychoanalytic formulations and multicultural perspectives from outside of psycho-analysis can together create more meaningful conceptualizations which take into account the lived realities of race and the ways in which these may be shaped by individual psychology.*

In an interview with uncommon relevance for the present day, Ralph Greenson and Ellis Toney (Greenson, Toney, Lim, and Romero, 1982) shared their thoughts about the impact of race on their analytic work. Toney's training analysis—conducted by Greenson from 1948 through 1954—was one of the first analyses to involve a black and white analytic dyad. Greenson, reflecting on the analysis, commented on his realization that “we lived in two

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different worlds and we were trying to understand each other's. It took an unusual amount of courage on Toney's part and on my part to admit that we were millions of miles apart in certain ways of thinking, values and so forth" (p. 186). Toney, in reply, delin-eated trust as one of the most difficult areas in black-white relationships: "... practically every black individual today has been traumatized in some way by the white person. If blacks have not been traumatized directly by whites, then through talk and hear-say, they have incorporated experiences that were traumatic"(p.188). This interview-remarkable for its participants' candor and willingness to consider analytic interactions with respect to race-stands out as an effort to open up a psychoanalytic discussion on race, culture, and the analytic process.

The aim of this paper is to extend psychoanalytic conversation about race and ethnicity. I will consider some of the ways in which race and ethnicity-and the social milieu in which they come to have meaning-influence the frame of psychoanalytic work both explicitly and subtly. To do so, I will present material from an interracial treatment in which interactions around race played an important role in deepening the clinical process. I will try to articulate some of the intersubjectivity of race and racial difference that characterizes contemporary life, from which the psychoanalytic situation is not immune. I will suggest that our understanding of race and ethnicity may benefit from a consideration of contemporary psychoanalytic formulations and multicultural perspectives from outside psychoanalysis. These approaches may together define a new site for psychoanalytically meaningful conceptualizations of race which take into account both social realities and personal psychology.

Some forty years after Greenson's analysis of Toney, race relations remains one of the most pressing problems of contemporary social life in the United States. In recent years, the popular imagination of this country has been captivated by public events in which race figured prominently. Race and racial resentments, never far from center stage, are again the focus of social consciousness through events like the Clarence Thomas hearings, the

acquittal of police in the beating of Rodney King, and in the open debate over Herrnstein and Murphy's *The Bell Curve* (1994). Nowhere was this more evident than in the aftermath of the O.J. Simpson criminal trial and the differing reactions of many blacks and whites to the verdict of not guilty. At the instant that many whites recoiled in stunned silence, many African-Americans cheered either because it seemed entirely plausible that Simpson had been framed by a police department long recognized as racist or because Simpson-guilty or innocent-was one of few black men in history who could marshal the resources necessary to use the legal system to his full advantage, making his success an ironic affirmation of social progress.

If nothing else, these reactions to the Simpson verdict confirm a postmodern social reality: in significant ways, most blacks and whites construct and are constructed by vastly different social worlds. At the same time, when these multiple realities interact, the result is far from a postmodern ideal of the coexistence of contradictory points of view. Instead, the clash of opposing realities often generates violence of one kind or another. For example, while whites feared blacks would riot in Los Angeles following the Rodney King verdict, many African-Americans expected that whites might enact some revenge for Simpson's acquittal in legislatures and courtrooms by further undermining affirmative action and other social programs.

At the *fin de siècle*, we remain a country obsessed with the problem of racial division and its multiple realities while we are often paralyzed in our attempts to respond effectively. As one columnist recently put it, “[N]othing is more important in America than what blacks and whites do in the name of race, to themselves or each other” (Rosenthal, 1995). In this respect, we have moved from the notion of a melting pot to the recognition that the pot is boiling over. How then does the racial divide of our culture affect the culture of the consulting room?

When I open the door to my waiting room to greet a new patient, the fact that I am a person of color carries important social meanings. Race and ethnicity-particularly when they are

observable features of the analyst's self-represent a kind of self-disclosure. Although I have not conveyed anything in particular about myself, the fact that race is written on my face shapes the clinical dialogue to follow. While it is reasonable to argue that any of our particularities as individuals (e.g., age, gender, or the way that we furnish our offices) also represent disclosures of this kind, I believe that the valence of race may be of a different order in the present climate of the racial divide.

When I work with patients of color, most of them directly acknowledge our shared racial background or shared status as members of minority groups. Many have elected to see me because I am a person of color. In due time we usually discover together the particular realities and fantasies that undergird their choice. By contrast, many of my white patients do not explicitly mention our racial difference. At the same time, their metaphors, allusions, and other derivatives suggest to me that it is very much on their minds—for example, in the case of a patient in consultation who repeatedly states his “ability to get along with everybody, I mean everybody” when this is ostensibly not a part of the difficulties he is trying to communicate to me. When racial similarity or difference is not mentioned during the early part of a treatment, I have found it useful to comment on this. In such a case, I might acknowledge the social climate surrounding open talk about race in this country and then wonder with the patient whether, for example, his thoughts about his ability to get along with all people represents his way of speaking about something he did not feel he could approach more directly. In this way, I am offering the patient an opportunity to consider the expanded possibilities for communication provided by treatment.

At the same time, I am also responding to the social milieu in which we practice. In contemporary America race carries profound meaning. While it is undoubtedly true that my observation that the patient has avoided mention of our racial difference focuses attention on only one aspect of the interactive field, it seems to me that clinical silence about race is equally directive. Failing to acknowledge racial difference is not neutral. We might consider,

for example, what is conveyed when the clinician does not speak to her/his blackness, or when her/his whiteness is assumed to speak for itself. Clinical silence about race may be perceived-and with some justification-as a commentary on the analyst's effort to stay out of the fray, to opt out of the tension that comes with open talk about race. Ambiguity of this sort can close off the clinical encounter in ways that are at odds with what we ideally wish to offer our patients. Most of the time, my observation that the patient and I have not yet talked about the fact that the patient is white (or Japanese, or Latina, etc.) and I am African-American does not prevent exploration of the patient's racial meanings or obviate fantasy. If anything, I think it facilitates the admission of fantasy to the treatment relationship and sets a tone for the exploration to follow (cf. Greenberg, 1995), as that which had been excluded from conversation is invited to assume a voice in the consulting room. If the invitation cannot be accepted, understanding the reasons for this over time defines an equally important analytic exploration.

When previously unmentioned racial difference is brought into the treatment relationship, my experience has been that white patients respond nearly universally by saying the difference is "not a problem," although this is usually then followed by an implicit statement of exactly the problem that the patient expects will complicate the treatment, namely, the fear of saying something that would be perceived as racist or discriminatory. Holmes (1992) has commented that this is a familiar fear for patients in cross-race treatment dyads. She notes that patients worry that they will express aggressive urges in racist attitudes and often hope that racial material will not be interpreted even if it enters their associations. Simpson (1993) suggests that therapists also fear that their countertransference will be coded in racial terms. He further notes that it is "strange that those of us who are prepared to accept our murderous wishes, for example, towards members of our families cannot, or will not, accept that we might have 'racist' thoughts or feelings" (p. 291).

It seems inevitable that all of us-patients and analysts-will

have racial thoughts and feelings that are libidinally and aggressively tinged. Just as the analyst may become aware of the patient's explicit and subtle immersion in cultural and personally idiosyncratic dialogues about race, it is also quite likely that the patient will, in time, catch the analyst in some unintended racial reflections of his or her own. Speaking to the patient's concerns about racist content and the sociocultural realities of race can become a way of understanding the patient's relationship to ideas, feelings, and behaviors that evoke anxiety and vulnerability. I believe that a parallel process may occur with respect to the analyst's racial countertransference.

### *Clinical Illustration*

Ms. C was a thirty-year-old white woman who entered treatment in an effort to cope with the divided loyalties she felt between progressing in her career and staying at home to raise her two young sons. She felt trapped by either option: she was critical of women who "abandoned" their children to day care to fulfill their personal ambitions, and she was unhappy with the prospect of being what she termed a "fifties housewife with no brain," dependent on her husband for financial security. At the same time, Ms. C wanted very much to be a good mother and worried that she was not. She felt constant anger toward her husband, whom she believed was untroubled by comparable soul-searching, and she was extremely critical of him in ways that dismayed both of them.

Ms. C felt very uncertain about what she really wanted for herself. She also felt guilty that she was in the privileged position of being able to decide. She criticized herself equally for wanting to return to work and for desiring to remain at home with her children. Although Ms. C was friendly and warm during her sessions, at times she seemed excessively polite. I had the impression that she was expecting our interactions to deteriorate into animosity. From the start, she was anxious about the prospect of talking

about herself. She wished to speak freely, and she understood the need for candor but was worried about what her treatment would reveal about herself.

In the early sessions, we discussed some of the reasons behind Ms. C's concern and aspects of her history which seemed to relate to this issue. She recognized that feeling criticized and being critical in turn were problems that regularly occurred in her marriage. A similar difficulty had pervaded her relationship with her mother, which had soured when Ms. C entered adolescence. Mother and daughter argued violently until Ms. C was well into her twenties, reaching a rapprochement just before Ms. C's own marriage. Since then, good will between them seemed to have been purchased through the patient's defensive idealization of her mother.

Ms. C's expectation was that I would come to feel as critical of her as she felt about herself and she feared exposure. When I wondered what she feared I would find fault with, she mentioned our racial difference. She acknowledged that upon first meeting me, she had been surprised to discover that I was black. She told me that the analyst who referred her to me had not mentioned that I was a person of color, and the thought that I might be black had simply not occurred to her. For Ms. C, and perhaps for most patients, the expectation is for the therapist to be white. Ms. C was quick to reassure me that she didn't expect "a problem." All the same, she worried openly that she might say something that would be offensive to me, or, worse, that she might unthinkingly make a comment that would otherwise strain our ability to develop a relationship. Her fear of her aggression, particularly her worry that she would be unintentionally hostile, was now located in her relationship with me. At the same time, Ms. C's social concern about these issues was also a significant resistance. Her apprehension about the misunderstandings, antagonism, and sensitivities between blacks and whites in the wider culture gave credence, she believed, to her view that her treatment would be interrupted by these same problems. As a result, although she tried to be open, she felt it reasonable to "play it safe."

During a session after I had been away on vacation, Ms.C greeted me in the waiting room and immediately noticed that I was now wearing an engagement ring. As she walked into the office, she asked excitedly, "Is that an engagement ring?" Settling into the hour, she repeated her question and appeared crestfallen when I responded with a query intended to help her expand upon her observation. I asked about her thought. She reasoned in a perfunctory fashion that while it certainly *looked* like an engagement ring, she couldn't be sure. Perhaps the ring was for some other purpose. She obliged with a series of associations, offered in a lackluster manner. My efforts to discover what had interfered with Ms. C's attempts to decide that the ring was an engagement ring, or what her feelings were about it, did not meet with success.

When I thought about this session later, I realized that Ms.C and I had engaged in something of ritualized encounter. I was aware that her question about my engagement ring was a request that we interact more personally. Although I had in effect introduced my personal life into the session by wearing the ring in the first place, I believe that my reluctance to acknowledge simply that I was engaged was a retreat into stereotyped technique and reflected a hesitation to engage with my patient more fully.

In the next hour, I acknowledged that I had not answered Ms.C's question and told her that my ring was indeed an engagement ring. She became animated. She had been sure that it was an engagement ring but wanted confirmation. This time, however, her associations about my engagement were more productive and contained expression of her ambivalence about marriage and motherhood, including a joke about what I was getting myself into.

I wondered with Ms. C why she needed me to acknowledge something she already knew. She said that she was not sure, but my unwillingness to answer had felt strange to her and vaguely dishonest. Over the next several weeks, this same sequence was repeated: she would raise a question about a piece of information which she in fact already knew about me and present it for my confirmation. As an example, she saw my name on a fund-raising

list for our local institute and wondered if the name next to mine was that of my fiancé, even though all of the other paired names were those of married or partnered couples. When I provided corroboration and noted that I thought she also knew the answer her thoughts would soon encompass some piece of racial content, usually a reflection of some event from the media or some reference to the fact that she was white and I black. The reference would not be connected to the previous content in any way that I could discern.

After I became aware of this sequence, I noted it with Ms. C, and we pieced together the following understanding. From her perspective, we were engaging in forbidden talk. She said that although she liked the idea that I answered her questions, from what she understood about therapy she believed that I was breaking some rule by directly responding. Both of us were doing something we shouldn't. I said that it seemed important to her that we were both doing it and then wondered if that might be the reason why her questions and my answers were followed by her talking about black issues or black-white problems. I said maybe her thoughts about blacks and whites felt like a risky thing to discuss, especially as a topic between us. Ms. C agreed. Although she had known some African-Americans, they had not talked about racial issues with each other even when this was something she had wanted to do. When reading the newspaper or watching television news, she felt worried about the state of race relations in the United States. She was concerned about crime in urban areas (that were usually black) and troubled by how little contact she had with blacks (apart from me) and how little personal involvement blacks had with whites. At the same time, she felt that people needed to be "careful" around this topic because something problematic could emerge (e.g., something racist), and the situation would only get worse.

Ms. C and I now discussed more openly the implications of her fears about the sensitivities that blacks and whites have with respect to each other. Whites are afraid of being labeled racist and blacks fear mistreatment based on past history. Ms. C mentioned

the likelihood that if I or any black person were to drive through her neighborhood, it would be assumed that we were en route to work rather than to our residence. Similarly, she wondered how welcome she would be in my black community. She worried that her openness with me would result in my seeing racist attitudes in her that she herself might miss.

Ms. C, however, seemed to express her thoughts more freely following this discussion—talking with more feeling about the problems of her adolescence and the friction with her mother. She became more attentive to the similarities and differences between us as women. She could now acknowledge feeling competitive with me (because I had what seemed to her to be a successful career) while permitting herself to express certain feelings of superiority (which she connected to being the mother of a new baby son). She remained hampered in her ability to express her aggressive thoughts and feelings more overtly and in her capacity to talk openly about those that did emerge.

I believe that these interactions show that my willingness to answer my patient's questions established a tacit negotiation and represented an enactment. To the extent that I engaged in talk she considered to be forbidden (providing some answers to questions), she would too (by mentioning racial issues previously identified as something about which she was fearful). These interactions seemed to allow the patient more associative freedom than before. She gradually allowed herself to experience a greater although still restricted range of feelings toward me.

From one perspective, Ms. C's request that I answer questions already known to her could also be viewed as her making a parody of our clinical exchange. Her effort to denigrate and devalue me may have been expressed in this aspect of our interaction as was revealed more directly later on in the treatment. During this phase, however, my predominant experience was that Ms. C's questions allowed her to evaluate whether or not I was being truthful with her, since she in fact already knew the answer. In this way, while her hostility was perhaps actualized through her distrust, my response, I think, conveyed my sense that our interaction

could weather it. At the same time, it is also conceivable that at this juncture I was operating with a blind spot and was not yet willing to recognize the portion of my patient's aggression that was directed at me.

My willingness to answer questions to which she already knew the answer prompted Ms. C to raise the stakes. She began to ask more personal questions, although these were the kinds of topics that would naturally emerge between two co-workers in almost any setting other than a clinical treatment. In general, her questions concerned some aspect of me as an African-American woman. She reported that she felt more vulnerable now because she did not already know the answers. As an example, she wondered about my plans for Martin Luther King Day. Since she did not have a Monday session, she wondered if I would be working. She was curious about where I had grown up. Specifically, she wondered what sort of racial setting I had lived in. More cautiously, she allowed herself to fantasize about my marriage, and eventually asked if my husband was also African-American. I decided that I would try and answer the questions that she asked to the extent that I felt it opened up our dialogue and as long as we could also learn more about the questions themselves and the ideas that prompted them. This also made sense to Ms. C. Sometimes a question would remain between us for several sessions before I answered.

My sense was that my willingness to respond to her in a reasonably direct way and my allowing her to know more about myself resulted in a lessening of her constraint and an increase in her ability to be affectively expressive. My experience of Ms. C's questions was that her interest was not superficial or voyeuristic. She confined many other of her thoughts about me (e.g., curiosity about my sexual life) to her associations alone and did not ask questions about them. It was my impression—shared with the patient—that she was trying to get a fix on me as an African-American woman against whom she could reference herself. Her questions seemed designed to assess my racial self in terms of my difference from and similarity to her and the danger and safety she could expect with me.

Our interactions around the questions were also important. Ms. C was relieved by my responsiveness. Admitting my racial self into the consulting room in a way that could not fail to implicate me personally seemed to permit her to grapple with herself more extensively and to expand what she could convey about herself. She was also able to express some ambivalence about my willingness to respond. She and I talked about the discomfort and several times assessed whether talking in this way was helpful to her. On this point, she was unequivocal in saying that "it makes me feel like we are both here." On my side, I felt as though my answers were a kind of "talking out of school." I felt some anxiety about working in a way that left me feeling particularly vulnerable even when I noticed that it seemed my ability to do so assisted my patient in speaking more freely about a greater range of her experience.

Ms. C began to describe her emotional reactions in greater detail. She seemed more comfortable with her awareness that her attention to racial issues reflected her interest in me and what went on in my mind. She spent the better part of a session captivated by the film *Pulp Fiction*, especially the relationship between the characters played by Samuel L. Jackson and John Travolta—who enjoyed a casual and philosophical relationship with one another even while they were involved in a considerable amount of violence. She thought that the characters—one black and one white—spent their time together "getting into each other's head." This reminded her of some of the experience she had had with me. I also understood it as a commentary on her view of the interactive relationship between us, which for Ms. C seemed to have an outlaw status.

Ms. C was disturbed (and fascinated) by the racial epithets used in the film by both blacks and whites. In talking with me, she hesitated to use the word "nigger"—the term used in the film—in her discussion. She was worried that the term would offend me but was also able to be curious about how I would react if she did. She talked about the fact that blacks could use this term among themselves with impunity but whites could not. When I pointed

out that whites certainly had used the term in the film, Ms. C wondered what blacks really thought about whites. She wondered how comfortable a black person could really feel with a white person, given the discrimination blacks encountered. I pointed out that this, of course, also raised the issue of what whites really thought about blacks. This became elaborated in terms of Ms. C's relationship with me.

Ms. C became preoccupied for a time with thoughts about racial violence between blacks and whites, as well as black-on-black crime. Consciously, she recognized she could also think about white-on-white violence but this "didn't mean anything" to her. Here, she was also talking about the way in which her own ethnic identity as a European-American mainly acquired its meaning to her in relation to someone of color. Talking about violence in black communities, she was puzzled about how people "in the same group and the same community" could do this to each other. Her associations led her to discuss unacceptable impulses in herself. She began to talk about the extent of the trouble she was experiencing as a mother to her young sons. The struggles between Ms. C and her boys reminded her of her adolescent rebellion against her mother. Ms. C feared that her children were deliberately provoking her as she had done to her mother. She was frightened of her extremely angry responses, felt much less in control of them than she had been able to let on, and worried that she would hurt her sons if she did not get help. Until this point, Ms. C had been silently struggling with her feelings of rage because she felt too ashamed to admit them.

Ms. C's sense of her unacceptable feelings led her to think more about her feelings of racism. She remained fearful of what she would unintentionally reveal about herself but now tried to talk about those feelings of which she was aware. She discussed her recent reactions to blacks, focusing on the negative judgments she had made and hated herself for making. These included her expectation of trouble when she saw young black men walking down the street and her dislike of several local African-American politicians.

It is clear that Ms. C's selective focus on violence in African-American communities (a selectivity echoed in our culture at large) was a means of contending with aggressive impulses from which she struggled to distance herself. Although she could now permit herself to be more openly critical of me, she continued to expect that I would be damaged by any rebuke or anger. This was especially the case when her racial reflections included talking about her profound ambivalence about affirmative action. She expected that I had received some benefit from these programs, and the tenor of her comments pointed to her fantasy of me as second-rate and unable to make it on my own. Aware now of the devaluing message she was conveying, Ms. C attempted to rescue both of us by associating to the social realities of racism in this country. Reversing herself, she spoke about the way in which racism can impede people of color regardless of their talents and abilities, making affirmative action necessary if controversial. She now felt worried about my reaction.

I noted that Ms. C seemed troubled by her fantasy because we shared the awareness that racial meanings carry cultural weight and pack considerable firepower. I acknowledged openly that her fantasy contained an idea designed to injure, and that most African-Americans would agree. I said because I had grown up having to deal with these kinds of ideas, it was possible that I wouldn't be hurt by them in the ways that she feared. From my perspective, however, I thought that what was more important was why she needed to offend, and I would try to help her to understand this. This then permitted us to examine in more detail what it meant to Ms. C to subject others to her anger and devaluation only to restore them later, as had occurred repeatedly in her relationships with her sons, her husband, and her mother. It also opened up an additional pathway to explore her own self-criticism and denigration.

On other occasions, Ms. C's racial reflections had a more libidinal cast and included expression of longings previously ward off. Her associations about black cultural life included envy of the

familiarity and close connections she observed between many blacks. By virtue of my blackness I could belong and have access to an involvement from which she felt excluded.

Reading an article on black feminism in the aftermath of the O. J. Simpson criminal trial, Ms. C became interested in the question of whether African-American women would side with Simpson because he is black or withhold support because of his history of domestic violence. Were African-American women more committed to racial solidarity than to their connections with other women? This echoed concerns Ms. C had in her relationship with me. Expecting the article to confirm her ideas about race (namely, that commitments to race superseded all else), Ms. C was surprised to read that younger African-American women, in particular, self-consciously differed from their mothers in permitting themselves more latitude, especially in finding important connections in their relationships with other women. She seemed particularly intrigued by the idea that mothers and daughters could think differently from one another and tolerate their differences, something she had not experienced in her relationship with her own mother. Ms. C also responded with some excitement to a phrase in the article which indicated that some younger African-American women declared that being black did not mitigate their attachments to whites ("some of whom we love"). Now Ms. C felt that there might be room for her in my world. That this might also include an erotic bond was revealed through her articulation of the fantasy that I was biracial, a product of a sexual tie between black and white. Her fantasy also suggests another meaning for her designation of racial talk as forbidden. Her involvement with me seemed to stir up conflicted wishes for an intimacy that she perceived as dangerous and destabilizing.

It remains my sense that the talk about race and racial difference between Ms. C and myself—once a forbidden topic—ushered in her ability to approach other material that felt risky to her, especially her fears about harming her young sons. Her present-day concerns about herself could then be admitted to the

session for our joint consideration of their place in her history, although they remained under the rubric of "forbidden talk" for some time.

### *Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in Psychoanalytic Treatment*

As Goldstein (1994) notes, self-disclosures can take many forms: disclosing information requested by the patient (e.g., Epstein, 1995); countertransference disclosure (Ehrenberg, 1995); the analyst's own difficulties in the analysis (Miletic, 1996) as well as the analyst's difficulties in his/her own life (Abend, 1995; Dewald, 1982), all of which may require the patient to accommodate to the analyst's subjectivity. Similarly, analysts write that while they disclose for a variety of intended and unintended purposes, the motivation is often either to create room in the treatment space or to repair a breach. In this way, the therapist's interactive availability constitutes the bricks and mortar of dyadic transactions. Just as two houses can have different designs requiring different plans for effective maintenance, clinical work requires the flexibility of employing different tools at different times.

My clinical illustration concerned two types of disclosure: an implicit self-disclosure occasioned by the therapist's being a person of color and a series of explicit answers in response to questions asked by the patient about the therapist's racial experience. The therapist confirmed a reality (that the ring she was wearing was indeed an engagement ring) following a mild rupture occasioned by the therapist's use of stereotyped technique and a rebuff of the patient's interest in a more personal response. Thereafter, disclosures were employed in the context of clinical interactions directed at assisting the patient in saying what was on her mind (Kris, 1982). My initial willingness to answer questions about information already known to the patient did increase her desire to know more and led her to formulate a more specific, personal inquiry about my life circumstances and attitudes. The patient did not, in my view, become "insatiable" (Freud, 1912), although her

involvement in her treatment deepened. As was evident here, patients' and analysts' talk about race can enliven a psychoanalytic dialogue. In some treatments, in fact, the talk about race may be the only way to enter into a psychoanalytic encounter, so great are the social challenges of race in contemporary society.

Psychoanalytic clinicians have convincingly argued that clinical attention be directed at racial issues and racial stereotypes, especially when they overlap with conflicted affects and desires in the transference (Holmes, 1992; Schacter and Butts, 1968). Race and ethnicity are understood to be the context for expression of the patient's personal psychology and may be deployed to serve psychodynamically relevant agendas. Holmes (1992) offers one example of this approach, describing how her patient's belittling attack against the analyst's race and gender served the protective function of warding off recognition of the patient's own feelings of self-loathing and rage. In this way, race comes to be treated as a psychoanalytic issue.

Although clinically valuable, this perspective may have the unintended consequence of obscuring the way in which race is both a psychoanalytic and a cultural experience. Talk about race becomes a vehicle for a psychoanalytic conversation and recedes as a matter of importance in and of itself. There is a tendency for race to become something to get past rather than something to live within. Race becomes only "skin deep," rather than an intimate and enduring aspect of personal social identity. As a further illustration of this point, while psychoanalysis has a richly complicated and contested theory of gender and sexual identity, there is no comparable body of psychoanalytic work with respect to racial and cultural identity. Even when race and ethnicity are considered more broadly, they are often treated as qualities that pertain only to patients or analysts of color. There is little in our literature, for instance, about the meaning that a shared racial background has when both members of the analytic dyad are white. Frankenberg (1993) suggests that whiteness is an unnoticed aspect of identity for most Americans. In recognition of this, Chodorow (1995) notes that

her work with European-American women has not typically “problematized their whiteness and its contribution to their sense of gender and sexuality”(p.526,n.).'

In a great many ways, psychoanalysis has maintained a contradictory relationship to culture. Psychoanalysis is cut from the very fabric of culture, albeit a very selective cloth. Our psychoanalytic models are based nearly exclusively on the protections and pathologies afforded by the Western nuclear family, which is itself a cultural entity. Although psychoanalysis resonates with the Western culture in which it is chiefly practiced, for most of its history it has also considered itself as offering a universal scientific rendering of human experience (Mayer,1996).

In a recent paper, Elliott and Spezzano (1996) argue that psychoanalysis is no more impervious to its cultural surround than was modern thought to the imprimatur of psychoanalysis. During the last fifteen years, cultural shifts on how human beings understand themselves and the very nature of reality have occasioned major changes in the clinical theory of psychoanalysis (Mitchell,1993). The technical emphasis on the analyst's anonymity and abstinence shares the stage with models attending to the facilitative utility of the analyst's presence, self-disclosure, and therapeutic provision (e.g., Bader, 1995; Lindon, 1994, Renik, 1995). Post-modern critiques are now increasingly imported into contemporary psychoanalytic practices (e.g., Barratt, 1993), although these

Connecting whiteness to European-American identity is itself a problematic cultural affair. Berke Breathed, the creator of the comic strip, Bloom County, offers us one perspective on the difficulty in a piece he published in the late 1980's. Oliver, an African-American youngster, walks into the local drug store to buy a copy of Ebony magazine. When the clerk asks him what Ebony is about, Oliver tells him "black persons, written for black persons, with exclusively black persons in the ads," then cheerfully purchases the latest issue. Moments later, Binkley, a white youngster, enters the store inquiring about Ivory magazine, whereupon the clerk anxiously shoos him out, saying. "I run a progressive newsstand here." For many Americans, white identity is synonymous with the idea of white supremacy. The hidden narrative is that whiteness can mean only one thing—a self-conscious, violently inclined superiority that must be kept under wraps. Ironically, this hidden idea remains protected when whiteness is not assumed to be a meaningful marker of identity and is not deconstructed psychoanalytically or culturally.

are not without their pitfalls (cf., Dunn 1995; Glass, 1993; Leary, 1994).

As Elliott and Spezzano indicate, it is also clear that psychoanalysis contributes to and is moved by cultural changes of all kinds. Renik (1990) suggests, for example, that the oedipal constellation-sexual rivalry in the context of love-is an important psychic organizer because of the prevalence of nuclear families and the way that relationships are structured within them. He notes that “future social changes may alter the shape of normative psychosexual development” (p. 201). It seems likely, for example, that ongoing revisions of the psychoanalytic theories of development and mind will be required as psychoanalysis takes seriously the extended family structure of African-, Hispanic- and Asian-Americans, families headed by gay partners, as well as the new reproductive technologies currently reshaping the contemporary definition of “family.”

### *Contemporary Psychoanalytic Practice and Multicultural Perspectives*

The interactive landscape that psychoanalysis now occupies (Mitchell, 1995) means that the analyst's authoritative rendering of the analysand's subjectivity has given way to attending also to the psychology of the analyst at work. The analyst is assumed to be a real counterforce in the treatment with a subjectivity of his/her own. As a result, psychoanalytic treatment has been increasingly recast as involving negotiated (Goldberg, 1987; Hatcher, 1992; Pizer, 1992) and intersubjective processes (e.g., Stolorow and Atwood, 1992).

The cultural landscape with respect to race and ethnicity has also shifted—a fact that is not yet represented in the psychoanalytic literature on race. On the surface, psychoanalytic formulations of race in the consulting room would already seem to embody the quality of pluralistic meaning endorsed by contemporary practice: race is treated as a carrier of cultural meaning which can be employed to serve any number of transference or defensive purposes.

A closer look at these conceptualizations, however, shows these racial meanings as highly constrained at best, rather than pluralistic or multifaceted. Rather than offering multiple perspectives, race here actually carries a number of cultural meanings. It most often symbolizes devalued, repudiated, or pathological contents. What is usually under discussion in most psychoanalytic writing about race is less about race per se than it is about racism and racial status. In consequence, much of the existing psychoanalytic literature is better appreciated for illustrating the psychodynamics of racism than for offering a commentary on race or cultural identity.<sup>2</sup>

Culturally sensitive treatment perspectives, including an emerging model of culturally sensitive psychoanalysis (e.g., Akhtar, 1995), begin with the assumption that culture plays a significant role in the development and maintenance of the self. Comas-Diaz and Greene (1994) note that people in majority and minority cultures in the United States have multiple sources of identity which clash, leading to interpersonal and intrapsychic conflict. Employing the construct of projective identification, as articulated by Burke and Tansey (1985), Comas-Diaz and Jacobsen (1987) have suggested that patients attribute ethnocultural characteristics to their therapists that relate to conflicts in their own ethno-cultural identities.

These models of ethnocentric identity and psychotherapy (e.g.,

Psychoanalysis does offer several useful models with which to articulate the psychic reality of racism. The racially different other becomes a container for projected wishes that the majority repudiates in themselves. Other theorists concerned with the narcissistic dimension of human experience suggest that racism is a response to the pain attending difference. To notice distinction is to become cognizant that another mind, person, or group possesses something that one does not. In consequence, the racially different other disturbs the sense of self-sufficiency and so evokes desire (Young-Bruehl, 1992). In either case, the group in power makes the other the repository of concerns that reflect its own preoccupations and effect a false sense of containing their disturbance by marginalizing the other. This becomes one means by which individual and group dynamics become translated into social policy with the result that psychic and social life become intertwined (Kaplan, 1993).

Greene and Comas-Diaz, 1994), emphasize that race may have a greater array of meanings culturally and psychologically than those occasioned by racism. Consider the following examples. Despite discriminatory practices, the United States is also home to a stable African-American middle and professional class whose considerable earning power has not gone unnoticed, as evidenced by advertising campaigns focused on people of color. Although at least four African-Americans have considered or attempted to run for the presidency, there was widespread speculation in 1996 that Colin Powell might have been able to win. Furthermore, "identity politics" (Sampson, 1993) offers another choice for the cultural life of people of color by endorsing, for example, an Afrocentric cultural ideal of racial solidarity which can include an affirmative separatism. Whether or not one agrees with these approaches, they now represent alternatives to the devalued representations of people of color implicit in stereotypes. Race can and does mean more than a devalued content, at least to some people. We would therefore expect that these new cultural meanings would have their own agendas, even as they enter the psychoanalytic consulting room to serve psychodynamically relevant agendas as well. This expanded array of racial meanings must become recognizable to psychoanalysts if it is to enter into the psychoanalytic lexicon (Chodorow, 1994).

While most models of culturally specific treatment recognize that the racial self is multiply determined, they also argue that in the social climate of the United States, racism remains a powerful and a significant commonality for people of color (Greene, 1993). The terms in which racism is expressed have undergone some revision. While de facto exclusion and marginalization are apparent and widespread, particularly in our cities, contemporary racism also shows itself in institutional practices, "glass ceilings," and environmental attitudes. Furthermore, while these forms of racism are maddeningly evident to people of color and are experienced as an inescapable aspect of American social life (Smith, 1993), they are often dismissed by many in the majority culture.

From this perspective, while race is a social construction and

specific racial meanings are socially determined, the fact of a racially identifiable body also puts constraints on the psychological experience of African-Americans. For this reason, Comas-Diaz and Minrath (1985) have suggested that therapeutic work in an inter-ethnic/racial patient-therapist dyad can progress only if both the manifest and the symbolic meanings of race and ethnicity are carefully worked through and if the reality of societal discrimination is acknowledged (including the possibility that discrimination exists in ways that the therapist cannot yet apprehend).

Cultural change, changes in contemporary psychoanalytic practice, and the emergence of alternative formulations of race in treatment models largely outside of psychoanalysis suggest the need to define new, psychoanalytically useful conceptualizations of race. First, race functions as a kind of positivistic fact: it is undoubtedly real and pertains to real world history. Second, it operates within the realm of postmodern possibility: particular racial meanings represent social constructions that are elastic and shaped in accord with specific prerogatives, personally (as was the case for Ms. C) and culturally (as evidenced by enduring stereotypes).

I believe that a psychoanalytically meaningful approach to race for contemporary practice is situated in the conceptual space in between these perspectives. Race, in this sense, cannot be taken for granted as a material entity and does not speak for itself. Neither is it only a socially constructed harbinger of multiple readings. A psychoanalytically productive conceptualization of race is, as a result, dynamic and context-dependent, even as race remains something that is "really real" (Greene, 1993).<sup>1</sup> As a result, the conceptual and clinical space in which racial experience may be apprehended is fragile. It inheres in creative tension rather than settling for one perspective or another.

"Kaplan (1993) articulates a similar position: "Race and gender are constructs that produce material effects, material oppressions, even as one battles against such constructions and argues that they are alterable" (p.510)

The approach to race that I am developing has much in common with Chodorow's (1994, 1995) recent theorizing with respect to gender. She argues that while psychoanalysts need to recognize the inextricable cultural and linguistic contributions to psychological gender experience, gender is also "not entirely culturally or politically constructed" (1995, p. 517). Gender, she argues, is given psychic life via a universal process of subjectivity, namely, the human capacity to endow experience with nonverbal emotion and unconscious fantasy meanings. This shared quality of subjectivity, however, does not give rise to universal or stable contents. Gender and sexual experience inhere in the way an individual personally appropriates cultural stories (Chodorow, 1994). Like race, gender is worn and lived similarly *and* differently by each of us. The analysis of gender experience in psychoanalysis is a "product of interaction between therapist and patient as they work to create a consensual account of what is initially (and throughout) emotional, partially unconscious [and] fragmentary" (Chodorow, 1995, p. 525). Though Chodorow does not herself put it in these terms, her formulations suggest that gender flourishes in the tension between universal and unique experience.

Issues of race are sensitive in our multicultural, multiethnic, and multiracial society, just as sexuality was a sensitive issue in Freud's day and continues to be in our own. As recent events like the Simpson verdict show, it is difficult to discuss the texture of our different world-views. It is clear that we as a country have considerable difficulty negotiating the racial divide. I am not sure that we fare that much better in the consulting room.

To the extent that one endorses the view that race exists in the tension between lived actualities and constructed possibilities, the psychoanalytic clinician requires a clinical stance that admits both poles of the tension into the treatment encounter. The whole of psychoanalytic practice now recognizes that features of the analyst's self are always at play, influencing the treatment interaction. This has led to a new interest in how the analyst may best make use of herself/himself in order to further the goals of the treatment,

namely, the patient's capacity to better understand his or her own psychological experience.

Renik (1995) has offered a cogent critique of the notion of the anonymous analyst, noting that the principle of anonymity, rather than clearing the field, instead promotes active idealization of the analyst by assuming that if the analyst's ideas were known, the patient would no longer be in a position to think for himself or herself. He offers the technical prescription that the analyst should articulate everything that in his/her view will help the patient to understand where the analyst is coming from and where he/she wants to go with the patient. As Renik notes, this may require the analyst to depart from his or her preferred ways of proceeding and to bear a measure of discomfort, just as the patient is asked to do. The analyst's understanding is always open to a countercritique by the patient (Renik, 1995).<sup>4</sup> Disclosures may be said to acquire their meaning in the tension between the principles by which the analyst is guided in offering them (Renik, 1995) and the treatment effects of these disclosures as evaluated by both patient and analyst.

I believe the interactive process between Ms. C and myself facilitated the clinical work because of the particular way in which race was discussed. Race and racial difference were sustained within a dynamic tension: Ms. C and I worked within a context in which race was treated as an actuality and as a sociocultural fact, even as it was also available for the patient's idiosyncratic scripting of it to serve dynamic agendas. In this case, the shared acknowledgment about the difficulty of speaking openly about race actualized a sociocultural reality and was real life between us. My

<sup>4</sup>It is also the case that once the analyst discloses something to the patient, or analyst and patient highlight an implicit disclosure as being important, its status changes in the clinical encounter. Simply put, it becomes "for real." It cannot be retrieved or "taken back," even though analyst and patient may disagree about the meaning of what was conveyed. Furthermore, as Greenberg (1995) notes, "if it is true that everything we do reveals something, it is equally true that everything we do conceals something else" (p. 195). Disclosures alone do not resolve the problem of the analyst's anonymity.

disclosures and the resultant open discussion about race and racial difference permitted the patient to gain access to the reality of me as a racially distinct subject with vulnerabilities of my own. This permitted race and racial difference to exist between us as something that enabled the racial divide to lead to a bridge to more meaningful clinical process (Margolis, 1996). Although this occurred in the context of a tacit negotiation that emerged as an enactment-engaging in forbidden talk-it also allowed the patient to enter more fully into her own subjectivity, including the ability to allow previously warded-off material into her therapy.

It is clear that race and ethnicity exist as a potent force in the social milieu in which psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic psychotherapy are situated. It makes sense to assume that it operates as a powerful and pervasive influence on the treatment process in ways that clinical psychoanalysis has not been in a position to appreciate before. Increasing attention to cultural issues at large is drawing attention to the culture of the consulting room. This, in turn, may point to the utility of critiquing not only the anonymous analyst, but the racially anonymous one as well.

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